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DO NOT PASS GO, DO NOT COLLECT $200: THE REPORTER'S
PRIVILEGE TODAY
Douglas E. Lee*
The compelled production of a reporter's resource materials and testi-
mony... constitutes a significant intrusion into the newsgathering and
editorial processes and may substantially undercut the public policy fa-
voring the free flow of information to the public that is the foundation
for the reporter's privilege. Except in the rare instances in which a party
can meet the three-part tests established by both the statutory and consti-
tutional privileges, courts should preserve the neutrality of the press and
decline to make reporters participants in a judicial proceeding merely be-
cause they carry out their constitutionally protected responsibilities.'
It seems to us that rather than speaking of privilege, courts should simply
make sure that a subpoena duces tecum directed to the media, like any
other subpoena duces tecum, is reasonable in the circumstances, which is
the general criterion for judicial review of subpoenas. We do not see why
there need to be special criteria merely because the possessor of the
documents or other evidence sought is a journalist.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
Any discussion of the reporter's privilege must begin by recognizing
that these diametrically opposed views of the privilege have developed in
the same legal environment. The North Carolina trial judge so eloquently
defending the privilege and the United States Court of Appeals panel so
easily dismissing it had before them the same First Amendment, the same
United States Supreme Court precedent, the same federal and state court
decisions, and similar state shield laws. Indeed, their opinions were issued
fewer than forty days apart. Yet the opinions are irreconcilable, the latter
refusing to recognize a public policy that the former holds aloft.
* Douglas E. Lee is a partner in the Dixon, Illinois law firm of Ehrman Gehlbach
Badger & Lee. Mr. Lee, who is a legal correspondent for the First Amendment Center in
Nashville, Tennessee, graduated cum laude from the Northwestern University School of Law
in 1987, where he was Coordinating Note and Comment Editor of the Northwestern Univer-
sity Law Review. He graduated summa cum laude from University of Illinois in 1984, where
he received B.A. degress in history and political science. The author thanks Joseph Wienman,
a student at Butler University, for his research assistance in preparing this article.
1. State v. Peterson, No. 01-CRS-24821, 2003 WL 22965551, at *3 (N.C. Super. Ct.
June 30, 2003).
2. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted).
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Perhaps better than any study or any complex constitutional analysis,
these opinions demonstrate that the extent, if not the existence, of the re-
porter's privilege is determined by public policy. Judges, legislators, prose-
cutors, reporters, and the public all play a role in shaping and reshaping this
policy to fit current events, trends, and expectations. Thus, the reporter's
privilege has not evolved as much as it has swung back and forth, and today
we find it unpopular and unsupported. Whether and when it will swing back
into popularity will likely depend upon the public's understanding of the
privilege and the benefits it is intended to bestow.
II. IS A PRIVILEGE A WEAPON OR A SHIELD?
To understand the privilege and its future, it is necessary to understand
the privilege's history, philosophical underpinnings, and relationship to
other evidentiary privileges. Traditionally, privileges have been viewed as
weapons, tools used by lawyers and witnesses to thwart efforts to ascertain
the truth. Professor Wigmore, for example, viewed privileges as exceptional
exemptions from the fundamental premise that "the public is entitled to
every man's evidence" and, therefore, posited four conditions he believed
should be satisfied before a privilege is allowed
First, the "communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed."4 Second, "[t]his element of confidentiality must be
essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the
parties."5 Third, this "relation must be one [that] in the opinion of the com-
munity ought to be sedulously fostered."6 And fourth, the "injury that would
inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater
than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation."7
Applying these conditions, Wigmore seemed satisfied that the common
law was correct to recognize the attorney-client, priest-penitent, and hus-
band-wife privileges. Wigmore, however, believed the physician-patient
relationship failed all but the third condition and, accordingly, argued that
privilege should not exist.' He also made no secret of his opinion that privi-
leges should be limited. He wrote that the privilege
remains an exception to the general duty to disclose. Its benefits are all
indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete .... It is
worth preserving for the sake of a general policy, but it is nonetheless an
3. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2192, 2285 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).




8. Id. §§ 2285, 2380a.
[Vol. 29
REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
obstacle to the investigation of the truth. It ought to be strictly confined
within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its prin-
cipal. 9
Despite the narrowness of Wigmore's conditions, states have relied
upon them in determining whether a privilege exists."0 Without applying the
conditions expressly, the United States Supreme Court echoed Wigmore's
concern that privilege obstructs the truth when it rejected President Richard
M. Nixon's assertion of executive privilege:
The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the
system depend on full disclosure of all facts, within the framework of the
rules of evidence .... [T]he allowance of the privilege to withhold evi-
dence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply
into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic
function of the courts."
Another school of thought, however, views privileges not as weapons
to damage the judicial system's ability to divine the truth but as shields to
protect freedom and liberty. One author has written that privileges
are a right to be let alone, a right to unfettered freedom, in certain nar-
rowly prescribed relationships, from the state's coercive or supervisory
powers and from the nuisance of its eavesdropping. Even when thrown
into the lap of litigation, they are not the property of the adversaries as
such; even in litigation, they may be exclusively the property of perfectly
neutral persons who wish to preserve despite litigation, just as they pre-
served prior to litigation, their right to be left alone in their confi-
dences.'
2
This view seems to be shared by most legislators, who have been much
more liberal than judges in recognizing and creating new privileges. Even a
cursory review of a few states' statutes finds privileges that undoubtedly
would make Wigmore cringe. California, for example, recognizes privileges
for psychotherapist-patient communications 3 and for sexual assault and
domestic violence counseling. 4 Illinois recognizes privileges between cli-
9. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2291.
10. See, e.g., In re Petition of Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 471 N.E.2d 601, 603 (Ill. App. Ct.
1984) (holding that bar association can assert privilege to protect members' evaluations of
associate judges).
11. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709, 712 (1974).
12. David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Fed-
eral Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REv. 101, 110-11 (1956).
13. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014 (West 2003).
14. Id. §§ 1035.8, 1037.5.
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ents and public accountants, 5 virtually all communications between a per-
son and his or her "clergyman or practitioner of any religious denomination
accredited by the religious body to which he belongs,"' 6 discussions be-
tween a person and a licensed social worker, 7 and, most recently, communi-
cations between a union member and his or her representative." South Caro-
lina, like many other states, protects environmental audits from disclosure. 9
While such privileges are rarely absolute, this myriad of privileges suggests
lawmakers are more willing than judges to elevate a person's "right to be
left alone" over the "basic function of the courts."
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
A. The Privilege Before Branzburg v. Hayes
The judicial reluctance to recognize privileges is evident in the history
of the reporter's privilege. One of the first chapters of this history was writ-
ten in 1957, when Marie Torre, a reporter for the New York Herald Tribune,
wrote a column in which she attributed unflattering statements about actress
and singer Judy Garland to an unnamed CBS executive. ° Garland sued and,
during the course of the litigation, sought to compel Torre to reveal her uni-
dentified source.2' Torre refused, citing a promise of confidentiality and
claiming a privilege under the First Amendment to protect that confidence.22
It is believed that Torre was the first reporter to assert a First Amendment
privilege in a civil case.23
The trial judge hearing Garland's case rejected Torre's then-novel
claim and held her in criminal contempt. 4 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that, "[i]f an addi-
tional First Amendment liberty-the freedom of the press-is here involved,
we do not hesitate to conclude that it too must give place under the Constitu-
tion to a paramount public interest in the fair administration of justice."25
The decision in Garland was not surprising, as it was preceded by a
number of cases in which courts had rejected reporters' attempts to avoid
providing confidential information to grand juries investigating criminal
15. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 450/27 (2006).
16. 735 id. 5/8-803 (2006).
17. 225 id. 20/16.
18. 735 id. 5/8-803.5.
19. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-57-30 (2005).
20. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 547 (2d Cir. 1958).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 547-48.
23. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686 (1972).
24. Garland, 259 F.2d at 547.
25. Id. at 549.
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matters.26 After Garland, almost all other courts facing the issue refused to
recognize a constitutional reporter's privilege.27
In 1970, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit broke from that precedent. At issue was the government's subpoena-
ing of Earl Caldwell, "a specialist in the reporting of news concerning the
Black Panther Party," to testify before a grand jury investigating possible
criminal activity within the party.28 Caldwell asserted a First Amendment
privilege against testifying, and the Ninth Circuit embraced it.29 The court
stated as follows:
The very concept of a free press requires that the news media be ac-
corded a measure of autonomy; that they should be free to pursue their
own investigations to their own ends without fear of governmental inter-
ference; and that they should be able to protect their investigative proc-
esses. To convert news gatherers into Department of Justice investigators
is to invade the autonomy of the press by imposing a governmental func-
tion upon them. To do so where the result is to diminish their future ca-
pacity as news gatherers is destructive of their public function.
30
Therefore, the court held that Caldwell could not be compelled to tes-
tify before the grand jury unless and until the government demonstrated a
"compelling need" for his testimony.3' The government asked the United
States Supreme Court to hear the case, and the Court agreed.
B. Branzburg v. Hayes
The Court heard arguments in the case on February 22, 1972.32 The
next day, the Court heard arguments in two other cases in which reporters
had been subpoenaed to testify before grand juries, Branzburg v. Hayes and
In re Pappas.33 In Branzburg, the Kentucky Court of Appeals refused to
recognize a First Amendment reporter's privilege and ordered the reporter to
testify before the grand jury.34 In In re Pappas, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts rejected a reporter's reliance on Caldwell and ordered the
reporter to appear before a state grand jury.35 On June 29, 1972, the Supreme
26. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 685-86.
27. See id. at 686.
28. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081-83 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 408 U.S. 665
(1972).
29. Id. at 1086.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1089.
32. Branburg, 408 U.S. at 665.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 667-68.
35. Id. at 674-75.
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Court issued a 5-4 decision in which it decided all three cases, affirming the
lower court decisions in Branzburg and Pappas and reversing the Court of
Appeals's decision in Caldwell.36
Justice White wrote the opinion deciding the cases, an opinion that was
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Pow-
ell.37 While the majority refused to recognize a privilege, it concluded with-
out explanation that "news gathering is not without First Amendment pro-
tections" and that reporters must be protected if grand juries attempt to im-
properly disrupt relationships between reporters and sources.38
The four dissenting Justices-Douglas, Stewart, Brennan, and Mar-
shall-recognized a newsgathering privilege. Justice Douglas interpreted the
First Amendment most strongly, declaring that reporters possessed an abso-
lute privilege against revealing confidential information.39 Justices Stewart,
Brennan, and Marshall did not recognize an absolute privilege but said the
First Amendment entitled news gatherers to protect confidential information
unless the government could
(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has in-
formation that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of law;
(2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by alter-
native means less destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demon-
strate a compelling and overriding interest in the information. °
The portion of the Court's decision that created most of the controversy
and confusion that followed, however, was a concurring opinion written by
Justice Powell. In his opinion, which many believe reads more like a dissent
than a concurrence, Justice Powell recognized a qualified privilege and
claimed the majority's decision to require the reporters to testify did not
necessarily deprive future news gatherers of First Amendment protection:
If a newsman believes that the grand jury investigation is not being con-
ducted in good faith[,] he is not without remedy. Indeed, if the newsman
is called upon to give information bearing only a remote and tenuous re-
lationship to the subject of the investigation, or if he has some other rea-
son to believe that his testimony implicates confidential source relation-
ships without a legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have access
to the court .... In short, the courts will be available to newsmen under
36. Id. at 708-09.
37. Id. at 667.
38. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 707.
39. Id. at 711 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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circumstances where legitimate First Amendment interests require pro-
tection.4 1
C. The Growing Recognition of a First Amendment Privilege
Whether because or in spite of the decision in Branzburg, most of the
federal courts subsequently considering the issue began to recognize a First
Amendment reporter's privilege, at least in some contexts. Shortly after the
decision in Branzburg, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that Branzburg should not be read to prevent the assertion of a
privilege in civil cases.4 2 In 1975, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that a qualified First Amendment privilege protected con-
fidential sources in criminal cases.43 Two years later, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that a filmmaker could assert a First
Amendment privilege to protect information he deemed confidential." Dur-
ing the next twenty years, United States Courts of Appeals in the First, Sec-
ond, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits recog-
nized at least a limited, constitutional reporter's privilege.45
D. The Rejection of a First Amendment Privilege
Although a few courts after Branzburg had refused to recognize a First
Amendment reporter's privilege in criminal cases,46 that view received
widespread attention in 2001 and 2002, when author Vanessa Leggett spent
168 days in jail for refusing to provide tapes of interviews she had con-
ducted to a federal grand jury in Texas. Leggett conducted her interviews
41. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
42. Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986, 993 (8th Cir. 1972).
43. Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1975).
44. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1977).
45. See, e.g., United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1182 (1st Cir. 1988)
(holding that qualified privilege protects disclosure of unpublished information in criminal
cases); LaRouche v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that
qualified privilege protects confidential sources in civil cases); United States v. Caporale, 806
F.2d 1487, 1504 (11 th Cir. 1986) (holding that qualified privilege protects unpublished in-
formation in criminal cases); United States v. Burke, 700 F.2d 70, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1983)
(same as LaRouche Campaign); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding
that qualified privilege protects confidential sources in civil cases); United States v. Cuthbert-
son, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that qualified privilege protects confidential
sources and unpublished information in criminal cases); Miller v. Trans-America Press, Inc.,
621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980) (same as Nat'l Broad Co.), modified on reh 'g, 628 F.2d
932 (5th Cir. 1980).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1998); In re Shain, 978
F.2d 850, 853-54 (4th Cir. 1992); Storer Commc'ns, Inc. v. Giovan, 810 F.2d 580, 584-85
(6th Cir. 1987); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d
1030, 1049-50 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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over four years in six states for a book she was researching about the murder
of socialite Doris Angleton.47 Aware of her interviews, Federal Bureau of
Investigation agents tried to recruit Leggett to join the investigative team as
a paid confidential informant.4" When she refused, she was immediately
served with her first grand jury subpoena.49
After providing non-confidential information to the grand jury in De-
cember 2000, Leggett was subpoenaed again six months later, this time to
surrender all of her original tape recordings, all copies of those recordings,
and all transcripts prepared from those recordings. ° Even though she re-
sisted this overly broad subpoena, the Justice Department failed to offer any
evidence that it complied with 28 C.F.R. § 50.10, which requires the De-
partment to, among other things, obtain the approval of the United States
Attorney General before subpoenaing a reporter.5 The prosecutor admitted
at Leggett's contempt hearing that the subpoena was "unspecific" and that
he could not explain why some of the information had been demanded. 2
Nevertheless, the government was not required to justify the subpoena in
any way, and Leggett was found in contempt.5 3 Unwilling to break her
promises of confidentiality, Leggett spent the next 168 days in jail, not be-
ing released until the grand jury expired.54
In refusing to reverse the trial judge's finding of contempt, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the notion that any-
thing in Branzburg protected Leggett from a grand jury subpoena. Any
reporter's privilege, the court said, was "ineffectual against a grand jury
subpoena absent evidence of governmental harassment or oppression."56
Because all witnesses are protected against harassment by the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure,57 however, the court essentially refused to recognize
any additional protection for reporters.
A little more than a year later, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit issued its decision in McKevitt v. Pallasch.58 In that
47. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Leggett v. United States, 535 U.S. 1011 (2002)
(No. 01-9803).
48. Id. at 3-4.
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 5.
52. Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 4, In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, No. 01-20745 (5th
Cir. Nov. 13, 2001).
53. Writ of Certiorari, supra note 47, at 6.
54. Columbia Journalism Review, http://www.cjr.org/issues/2002/2/qa-leggett.aps (last
visited Dec. 9, 2006).
55. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, No. 01-20745, slip op. at 6 (5th Cir. Aug. 17, 2001).
56. Id.
57. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
58. 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
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case, Michael McKevitt, an alleged Irish Republican Army activist being
tried in Ireland for directing terrorism and belonging to a banned organiza-
tion, asked an Illinois district court to compel journalists writing a book
about one of the witnesses against him to turn over tapes of several inter-
views they conducted during their research. 9 The authors refused, claiming
Branzburg protected their unpublished material from disclosure.6" After the
trial court rejected the journalists' claims, the writers appealed to the Sev-
enth Circuit.6
In affirming the trial court, influential Judge Richard Posner started
with Branzburg, which he concluded did not recognize a First Amendment
reporter's privilege. 62 He then chipped away at the decisions of the courts of
appeals that had recognized a privilege. Some of those cases, he said, "es-
sentially ignore" Branzburg.63 Others, he claimed, misread the case. 4 And,
still others, he complained, "audaciously declare that Branzburg actually
created a reporter's privilege., 65 All of these decisions, Posner concluded,
"can certainly be questioned., 66
Even more dubious, Posner said, were the decisions from the four
courts of appeals that allowed news gatherers to protect nonconfidential,
unpublished information from disclosure. 67 Because the court in Branzburg
dealt only with confidential sources, he wrote, the courts extending
Branzburg to nonconfidential information "may be skating on thin ice. 68
Unable to overrule these courts, Posner ignored them. Despite the fact
that all of the justices in Branzburg had agreed that newsgathering was enti-
tled to at least some First Amendment protection, Judge Posner concluded
otherwise: "We do not see why there needs to be special criteria merely be-
cause the possessor of the documents or other evidence sought is a journal-
ist."'69 Moreover, he said, in cases involving only unpublished material and
not confidential sources, "it is difficult to see what possible bearing the First
Amendment could have on the question of compelled disclosure. ' '70 Posner
said that the only reason these writers wanted to protect their unpublished
information was to protect their material's marketability and profitability.7'




63. Id. at 532.
64. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 532.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 533.
68. Id.
69. Id.




On the heels of the decision in McKevitt came the well-publicized case
involving reporters Judith Miller and Matthew Cooper.72 In resisting sub-
poenas served by Special Counsel Patrick Fitzgerald in a grand jury pro-
ceeding involving allegations that government officials improperly disclosed
the identity of a Central Intelligence Agency operative, the reporters as-
serted the First Amendment privilege they said was recognized in
Branzburg.73 In rejecting the reporters' argument, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit could not have been more hos-
tile toward them.
In Branzburg, the court said, "the Highest Court considered and re-
jected the same claim of First Amendment privilege on facts materially in-
distinguishable from those at bar."74 According to the appellate court, the
Supreme Court rejected the privilege "in no uncertain terms" and in reason-
ing "transparent and forceful. 75 "Unquestionably," the circuit court con-
cluded,
the Supreme Court decided in Branzburg that there is no First Amend-
ment privilege protecting journalists from appearing before a grand jury
or from testifying before a grand jury or otherwise providing evidence to
a grand jury[,] regardless of any confidence promised by the reporter to
any source. The Highest Court has spoken and never revisited the ques-
tion. Without doubt, that is the end of the matter.
76
Facing imprisonment, Miller and Cooper offered "the Highest Court"
the opportunity to revisit the question.7 7 The Court declined that opportu-
nity,78 saying nothing, but leaving many with the impression that the circuit
court's analysis of Branzburg and its rejection of a First Amendment privi-
lege, indeed, is the end of the matter.
E. The First Amendment Privilege Today
After the decision in the Miller and Cooper case, reliance on Branzburg
for a reporter's constitutional privilege is problematic at best, especially in
criminal cases. Yet, hope still remains for reporters. Less than five months
after deciding Miller, the District of Columbia Circuit considered the privi-
lege in a civil case brought by Dr. Wen Ho Lee, the Department of Energy
72. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reh'g en
banc denied, 405 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 125 U.S. 2977 (2005).
73. Id. at 965.
74. Id. at 968.
75. Id. at 969-70.
76. Id. at 970.




scientist accused of espionage in 1999. The court's decision was written by
Judge David Sentelle, the same judge who wrote its opinion in Miller, but
Sentelle, in this case, was more generous in describing Branzburg, saying,
"[n]ot only the breadth of this claimed privilege, but its very existence has
long been the subject of substantial controversy."7 9 The court then held that,
despite this controversy, a reporter can assert a qualified, constitutional
privilege in a civil case, one that can be overcome only if the litigant can
demonstrate that the information sought goes to "the heart of the matter"
and that he has exhausted "every reasonable alternative source of informa-
tion.
,8 °
Also encouraging for reporters is the decision in New York Times Co. v.
Gonzales, a grand jury case in which a New York federal trial court refused
to follow Miller and, instead, followed prior Second Circuit precedent rec-
ognizing a First Amendment privilege. 8' The court in Gonzales also recog-
nized a qualified common law privilege that protects reporters from being
required to reveal confidential sources, which the court said applied in all
cases, including grand jury proceedings.82 To overcome this common law
privilege, the court said that the government must show that the identity of
the source is "highly material and relevant" to the proceeding, "necessary or
critical" to the claim or issue, and not obtainable from other sources.
83
Thus, a constitutional reporter's privilege, whether recognized in
Branzburg or simply rooted in the First Amendment, is alive, in at least
some places and in at least some contexts. At best, however, it has been
weakened significantly, and one hardly can be optimistic about its progno-
sis.
IV. ON THE FRONT LINES IN THE BATTLES OVER THE PRIVILEGE
While much of the law relating to Branzburg and the reporter's privi-
lege is made in appellate courts across the country, the front lines in these
battles are in local trial courts and newsrooms. Trial judges, after all, hear
the evidence and arguments, determine the relevancy and importance of
requested information, and create the records from which appeals are en-
couraged or discouraged. Trial judges, of course, also imprison reporters
who refuse to comply with orders to identify confidential sources or turn
over other unpublished information.
79. Lee v. Dep't of Justice, 413 F.3d 53, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reh'gen banc denied, 428
F.3d 299 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
80. Id. at 59 (quoting Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 636, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
81. N.Y. Times Co. v. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d 457, 484-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
82. Id. at 494-508.
83. Id. at 510 (quoting In re Petroleum Prods., 680 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1982)).
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Newsrooms, however, are becoming increasingly important battle-
grounds over the privilege as well. Editors and even publishers now weigh
promises of confidentiality. Media companies claim ownership of subpoe-
naed notes and video outtakes. Commentators, analysts, and bloggers dissect
newsroom decisions to honor or challenge subpoenas. This battle is impor-
tant because the manner in which newsrooms act and are perceived to act
significantly influences judicial and public support for the privilege.
A. The Importance of a Constitutional Privilege
Battles over the privilege typically begin when a reporter receives a
subpoena. At that point, the lawyer representing the reporter must first de-
termine what protections are available. This inquiry almost always starts
with the extent to which the reporter can claim a constitutional privilege. As
battered as it might be, if a constitutional privilege is found to exist, it can
serve as a strong shield against compelled disclosure of confidential or un-
published information. Indeed, in cases governed by federal law or in cases
in which no state shield law applies, the constitutional privilege might be the
only shield available. Even when a state shield law applies, however, the
coexistence of a constitutional privilege often increases the seriousness with
which the judge approaches the issue. The constitutional privilege also
makes relevant scores of federal district and appellate court decisions that a
trial judge otherwise might not consider.
Also, a constitutional privilege is important in those cases in which re-
porting crosses state lines and other legal boundaries. While the federal
courts are hardly consistent in recognizing a constitutional privilege, those
inconsistencies in many cases are more manageable than attempting to de-
termine, for example, which state's shield law governs a New York reporter
interviewing a source in Texas or an Arkansas reporter who receives an e-
mail from a confidential source in California.
B. The Federal Common Law Privilege
Additionally, in some cases, a reporter might be able to utilize a second
federal shield: a federal common law privilege against testifying. Essen-
tially, the federal courts recognizing this privilege have found that-
whatever protections Branzburg might or might not offer-the strong public
policy supporting the free flow of information requires that reporters be pro-
vided with a qualified privilege to protect the identity of their confidential
sources.' This qualified privilege requires the entity seeking the identity of
the source to "make a clear and specific showing" that the identity is "highly
84. See id. at 495-508.
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material and relevant" to the proceeding, "necessary or critical" to maintain-
ing the claim within the proceeding, and "not obtainable from other avail-
able sources." 85
Not all federal courts have recognized this privilege, however, and the
District of Columbia Circuit panel in Miller recently split over its exis-
tence. 6 Moreover, even when recognized, its applicability is limited to cases
governed by the federal rules of procedure, and its protections extend only
to the identities of confidential sources and not to other confidential or un-
published information.87
C. The Importance and Limits of State Privileges
In light of the uncertainties surrounding the existence and extent of the
constitutional and common law privileges, an applicable state privilege in
many cases will be a reporter's best protection against compelled disclosure.
As described and identified by the court in Gonzales, thirty-one states and
the District of Columbia have adopted statutory shield laws offering varying
degrees of protection for reporters; six states have provided such protection
in their constitutions, and courts in seventeen of the remaining nineteen
states have recognized a reporter's privilege. 8 Only Wyoming and Hawaii
have not recognized at least some privilege.89
Unfortunately, it is difficult to make generalizations concerning these
state protections. State statutory and common law privileges differ regarding
who may assert the privilege, whether the privilege can be asserted in both
civil and criminal cases, whether the privilege protects only confidential
sources or all unpublished information, and whether the privilege is absolute
or qualified.9"
D. Privilege Battles in Trial Courts
1. How Subpoena Battles Arise
How a privilege battle unfolds in a trial court depends both upon the
privileges available and the context in which the subpoena arises. The most
85. Id. at 510 (quoting In re Petroleum Prods., 680 F.2d at 7) (internal quotations omit-
ted).
86. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.2d 964, 972-73, 976-81 (Sentelle,
J., concurring), 982-86 (Henderson, J., concurring), 986-1001 (Tatel, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (D.C. Cir. 2005).
87. NY Times Co., 382 F. Supp. 2d at 495-508.
88. Id. at 502-04.
89. Id. at 503.
90. See Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, http://www.rcfp.org/privilege/
index.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2006) (summarizing each state's privilege laws).
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sinister and intrusive subpoenas are issued during grand jury or other crimi-
nal investigations and demand that reporters identify confidential sources.
Reporters, of course, resist these subpoenas vigorously, in part to protect the
source to whom they promised confidentiality and in part to demonstrate to
future sources that they will honor confidentiality promises. In these cases,
reporters almost always argue that important news gathering will be chilled
if they are unable to make and maintain promises of confidentiality.
In other cases, subpoenas seek unpublished information, such as video
outtakes, unpublished photos, reporters' notes, and recorded interviews.
These requests arise in both criminal and civil cases and usually are driven
by lawyers' desires to gain additional information about crime or accident
scenes or about what parties or witnesses said to reporters. In these cases,
reporters often argue that the subpoenas threaten the integrity of their news
gathering, interfere with their ability to gather news, and improperly trans-
form them into investigative arms of law enforcement or agents of civil dis-
covery.
In some cases, subpoenas seek only copies of published photographs or
television reports or testimony authenticating information in a news story or
article. Most media entities do not resist these subpoenas and, instead, agree
to provide copies of photographs and video reports for a reasonable cost and
to authenticate published material by affidavit.
2. How Trial Courts Approach and Apply the Reporter's Privilege
Whether considering the constitutional privilege, a common law privi-
lege, a shield law, or a combination of these protections, a trial judge first
should determine whether the subpoena was brought in good faith or
whether it, instead, was brought to harass the reporter or to interfere with the
reporter's news gathering. Protection from improperly motivated subpoenas
was recognized in Branzburg,9" is incorporated into the Federal Rules of
Civil and Criminal Procedure,92 and was even considered appropriate by
Judge Posner in McKevitt.93 Still, however, some courts conclude that bad
faith by itself is insufficient to block a subpoena. Rather, they say, bad faith
only triggers application of the qualified privilege's balancing test.94 This
approach cannot be correct, because under the federal rules a finding of bad
91. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972); id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(iv); FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2).
93. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003).
94. See, e.g., In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp. 2d 26, 29 (D.D.C. 2004)
("[T]he balancing test Justice Powell refers to should only be undertaken when a reporter is
asked to testify before a grand jury 'without a legitimate need of law enforcement."'), aff'd
on other grounds, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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faith requires that a subpoena be quashed, without resort to a balancing or
any other test.95
Once a court determines that a subpoena has not been brought for an
improper purpose, it typically applies some version of the three-part test
initially expressed in Justice Stewart's dissent in Branzburg6 and subse-
quently incorporated in some form in most states' qualified reporter's privi-
leges. Application of these tests, however, is hardly uniform and often ap-
pears driven by the result the trial judge desires.
In many cases, for example, how courts apply the three-part test ap-
pears to depend upon their views as to whether the reporter's privilege
serves an important public policy. In In re Special Proceedings,97 the court
was asked to compel an investigative reporter for a Rhode Island television
station to identify the person who provided him with a videotape of a public
official purportedly accepting a bribe.98 The tape, which was to be evidence
in a corruption trial, was subject to a court order prohibiting persons with
access to it from providing it to third parties. 9 After the reporter received
and aired the tape, the judge who entered the order appointed a special
prosecutor to determine whether charges for criminal contempt should be
brought against the person who released the tape."
Not surprisingly, the trial judge appeared determined to prevent the re-
porter's privilege from denying the prosecutor access to the name of the
person who defied the judge's order. Initially, the judge expressed doubt that
the case even came within the Rhode Island shield law, which does not pro-
tect sources of information concerning secret grand jury proceedings.'' Al-
though the tape was viewed only as evidence by the grand jury, the judge
easily concluded that the tape was a source of information as to what had
transpired before the grand jury. 2 The judge then stated that, even if the
shield law applied, it could not "trump the strong federal interest in enforc-
ing court orders [and] preserving grand jury secrecy.', 10 3 Finally, the judge
dismissed the notion that requiring disclosure of the source's identity would
burden the free flow of information, amazingly stating that "[w]ithout hav-
ing an opportunity to question the source and without knowing the source's
reasons for desiring confidentiality, it is difficult to determine whether the
95. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(A)(iv); FED. R. CRM. P. 17(c).
96. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
97. 291 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D.R.I. 2003).
98. Id. at 46.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 47.
101. Id. at 56 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-3(b)(2)).
102. Id.
103. In re Special Proceedings, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 56.
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source would have provided the tape, either directly or covertly, even in the
absence of' an assurance of confidentiality.'°4
With this mindset, it is no wonder the judge concluded that the special
prosecutor had overcome the privilege.' °5 Indeed, in reaching that conclu-
sion, the judge minimized the steps the prosecutor needed to take to demon-
strate that the information was not available from other sources.' 06 The judge
wrote the following:
Requiring the investigating authority in a criminal case to prove that it
has exhausted all other means for obtaining relevant information before
it can seek that information from a journalist would create serious prob-
lems and risks. It would present practical difficulties in determining the
point at which alternative sources have been exhausted and whether the
evidence available from those sources is as probative as the information
in the journalist's possession. Such a requirement also would threaten to
compromise the investigation because disclosing the efforts made to oth-
erwise obtain the information could alert potential targets of the investi-
gation thereby enabling them to flee, destroy evidence, and/or attempt to
influence witnesses. Finally, as this case aptly illustrates, such a re-
quirement would delay the investigation by forcing the investigating au-
thority to by-pass the most direct evidence available and begin its inves-
tigation by eliminating all possible alternative[,] and[] probably less reli-
able, sources for obtaining that evidence.'
0 7
In another recent case, United States v. Hale,'08 a trial judge similarly
unimpressed with the reporter's privilege had little difficulty overcoming
it.' °9 In this case, the government was prosecuting infamous white suprema-
cist Matthew Hale for, among other things, obstruction of justice."0 In its
obstruction of justice charge, the government alleged that Hale had influ-
enced his father to testify falsely to a grand jury that Hale had discontinued
a CNN interview after starting to cry in reaction to a murder committed by a
Hale follower."' Although the government had already received a statement
from the CNN producer present during the interview and a copy of the
videotape, it sought to subpoena reporter Jeff Flock to testify as to Hale's
demeanor. 12
104. Id. at 59.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 58.
107. Id.
108. 32 MEDIAL. RPTR. 1606 (N.D. Ind. 2004).
109. Id. at 1607-08.





Flock asserted a First Amendment privilege under Branzburg and ar-
gued that his testimony was unnecessary in light of the fact that the govern-
ment already had the producer's statement and the videotape." 3 While pur-
porting to be "mindful that the press serves an important and necessary
function in society," the court, citing McKevitt and Branzburg, found
Flock's privilege arguments unpersuasive.114 Recognizing that the producer
could testify to the same facts as Flock and conceding Flock's testimony
was not the "lynchpin" of the case against Hale, the court nevertheless or-
dered Flock to testify, reasoning that, in many cases, numerous witnesses
are "called to testify as to the same facts.""' 5
When motivated to do so, trial courts can overcome even absolute
privileges. In Svoboda v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., 16 for exam-
ple, an Ohio trial court judge hearing a defamation action was faced with a
radio talk show host and news director who claimed Ohio's shield law abso-
lutely protected her from being compelled to disclose a confidential
source.117 The statements at issue involved accusations that the plaintiff, a
reporter for a Toledo newspaper, was romantically involved with the news-
paper's co-publisher and that she was slanting her articles in accordance
with his views." 8 During discovery in the case, the news director testified
that she based the accusations on information from a confidential source
who had provided information to her on other occasions.' The news direc-
tor testified that she received the information when the source telephoned
her several weeks before she made the statement on the air.'
20
Obviously offended by the broadcast and stymied by the shield law's
absolute privilege, the trial judge parsed the statute's definitions to conclude
that the news director did not "procure[] or obtain[]" the "information" from
a "source" while "in the course" of her employment.' 2' First, the judge held
that the news director was not acting in a news-related capacity when she
spoke with her source because the news director received the information
passively and did not, despite knowing the source did not have first-hand
knowledge of the alleged relationship, ask the source the basis of the
source's information. 22 Second, the court found that because the source did
not have first-hand knowledge of the relationship, he or she did not qualify
113. Id. at 1608.
114. Hale, 32 MEDIAL. RPTR. at 1608.
115. Id. at 1607.
116. 805 N.E.2d 559 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
117. Id. at 560-61.
118. Id. at 560.
119. Id. at 560-61.
120. Id. at 560.
121. Id. at 562-67.
122. Svoboda, 805 N.E.2d at 566.
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as a "source" under the shield law.'23 Finally, the court ruled that the news
director was not gathering news at the time she spoke with the source be-
cause she did not ask investigatory questions, did not take notes, did not
initially consider the information newsworthy, and did not broadcast the
information during a news segment. 124 Despite the fact that these rulings
thrust the trial judge into matters of editorial and reportorial discretion in
which courts generally do not wade, 25 the Ohio Court of Appeals af-
firmed.
126
Of course, personal views as to the importance of the reporter's privi-
lege do not influence only those who find ways to overcome the privilege.
The judge's respect for the public policy advanced by the privilege in State
v. Peterson,127 for example, undoubtedly influenced his finding that, despite
the fact that the reporters at issue would be the best sources as to whether
police employees lied when they testified they had not spoken to the report-
ers, "the mere possibility of finding evidence that the officers did not testify
truthfully about their contacts with the news media does not warrant requir-
ing the reporters to disclose their confidential sources.' '128 Likewise, an Ala-
bama trial judge favorably cited Branzburg and other cases recognizing the
privilege when he held that even though a reporter's testimony about a
known source's statements was relevant and unavailable from other sources,
the testimony could not be compelled because the information was desired
only to attack the credibility of a witness, an issue the judge said was "tan-
gential."'
129
Personal views can also induce a trial judge to imaginatively avoid
contrary precedent. In Hobley v. Burge,3° an Illinois federal court judge
bound to follow McKevitt nevertheless found a way to quash a subpoena
directed at a reporter's notes of meetings with a non-confidential source. 3'
Although the material at issue in McKevitt was unpublished tape recordings
and although Judge Posner in McKevitt obviously had intended to destroy
123. Id.
124. Id. at 565-67.
125. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) ("The
choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size
and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or
unfair-constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be demon-
strated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with
First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.").
126. Svoboda, 805 N.E.2d at 568.
127. State v. Peterson, 31 MEDiAL. RPTR. 2501 (Sup. Ct. Durham County 2003).
128. Id. at 2504.
129. Cowan v. Cmty. Home Banc Inc., 31 MEDIA L. RPTR. 2498, 2501 (Ala. Cir. Ct.
2003).




the constitutional reporter's privilege, the judge in Hobley distinguished
McKevitt on the bases that McKevitt involved tape recordings, not notes, and
that Hobley involved notes that resembled trade secrets."' The court thus
concluded that notes subpoenaed as part of a "fishing expedition for some-
thing that might be helpful" were protected, as disclosure would pose an
"unwarranted intrusion" into the reporter's work.'33
3. Baby April Whiteside and America's Most Wanted
My own experiences before trial judges reinforce my belief that privi-
lege decisions are often result-oriented. In one case, an unidentified baby
was found dead along a canal in Whiteside County, Illinois. The client, a
journalist for the local newspaper, covered the story extensively and named
the child "Baby April Whiteside." Eventually, the baby was identified, and
her mother was charged with abandoning the child. The mother's attorney
then sought my client's notes of an interview with the baby's father, who
defense counsel claimed actually was responsible for the baby's death.
These notes, defense counsel argued, might assist him in impeaching the
father when he testified.
The Illinois shield law protects unpublished notes, and defense counsel
could not establish either of the prongs of the two-part test under Illinois's
shield law: that the disclosure of the information was essential to the protec-
tion of a public interest or that all other available sources for the information
had been exhausted. Because the father had not yet testified, defense counsel
could not show that any part of the interview was relevant to or necessary
for any impeachment, much less that the contemplated impeachment would
be more than tangential to the case. Moreover, because the father's testi-
mony was not yet known, any claim my client was the only source for the
impeaching evidence was entirely speculative.
Nevertheless, the trial judge refused to quash the subpoena, holding
that the reporter was the only source for the unpublished notes and that these
notes might be relevant if the father testified. To his credit, the judge ap-
peared to realize he was not correctly applying the Illinois shield law. In the
circumstances before him, however, he said he needed to balance the poten-
tially significant harm to the defendant if she were not able to fully impeach
prosecution witnesses against the relatively little harm-as he saw it-in
requiring the reporter to produce a few pages of notes of an interview with a
non-confidential source.
Faced with the unpleasant options of pursuing an expensive appeal or
sacrificing its principles, my client chose neither. Instead, my client pub-
132. Id. at 502-03.
133. Id. at 505.
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lished the entire interview, verbatim, so that the material being provided to
the defense counsel would already have been shared with the client's read-
ers.
In a similar case, a trial judge in Henderson County, Illinois, reached a
similar result. In People v. Boyd,'34 a reporter for "America's Most Wanted"
interviewed a child who was the only witness to the gruesome murder of his
father.135 After portions of the interview were broadcast, the attorney defend-
ing the man charged with the murder subpoenaed the unpublished portions
of the interview and the reporter's notes on the theory they might assist him
in cross-examining the child. 36 The reporter resisted, claiming privileges
under the First Amendment, the Illinois shield law, and the shield law of the
District of Columbia, where he lived and worked. 37 Of particular relevance
in the case was the fact that defense counsel had been able to examine the
child under oath twice, both times after the "America's Most Wanted" epi-
sode had been broadcast.'38
Even after reviewing the materials in camera and concluding that they
did not contain much, if anything, of significance, the judge refused to quash
the subpoena.1 39 In rendering his ruling, he expressed appreciation for the
quality of the briefs and the argument and, looking at me, said he fully un-
derstood the constitutional and other aspects of my argument. "But coun-
sel," he asked almost pleadingly, "do you and your client understand that I
have before me a man facing the death penalty?"
E. Privilege Battles in Newsrooms
1. Is Reporting Really Chilled?
Against interests like these and a variety of other interests of parties in-
volved in judicial proceedings, judges must balance the interests being as-
serted by the reporter. Since the days when a reporter's privilege was first
claimed, journalists have argued that the absence of a privilege chills news-
gathering by discouraging sources who believe they require confidentiality
before providing important information to reporters. 40 In 1979, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed:
134. No. 01 CF 31 (Henderson County, Ill. 2001).
135. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Stay at 2-3, People v. Boyd, No. 01 CF 31
(Henderson County, Ill. May 17, 2002).
136. Id. at 4.
137. Id. at 6.
138. Id. at 3.
139. Id. at 6-7.
140. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693-94 (1972).
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The interrelationship between newsgathering, news dissemination[,] and
the need for a journalist to protect his or her source is too apparent to re-
quire belaboring. A journalist's inability to protect the confidentiality of
sources [he or she] must use will jeopardize the journalist's ability to ob-
tain information on a confidential basis. This in turn will seriously erode
the essential role played by the press in the dissemination of information
and matters of interest and concern to the public.'
41
Time Inc. Editor in Chief Norman Pearlstine echoed that sentiment in
testimony to the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate in 2005,
when he said that recent stories in Time concerning suicide bombings in
Iraq, the treatment of a detainee at Guantanamo, and the vulnerability of
nuclear plants to terrorist attack could not have been published without in-
formation from confidential sources. 14 2 Pearlstine testified that after Time
decided to comply with the subpoena in the Cooper case, many of the maga-
zine's "valuable sources" said they would no longer cooperate on stories.
43
He concluded that "[t]he chilling effect is obvious."'
' 44
As Pearlstine also noted during his testimony, however, news organiza-
tions in recent decades have successfully relied on confidential sources to
expose the Watergate burglary and coverup, probe the controversy that led
to President Clinton's impeachment, and reveal the Enron and Abu Ghraib
scandals.1 45 Yet all of this reporting, including the 2005 Time reporting
Pearlstine lauded, was performed in a legal and journalistic environment
without a clear reporter's privilege-an environment Pearlstine described as
marked by "extraordinary chaos," "utter disarray," and "confusion by
sources and reporters.
These logical inconsistencies in the "chilling effect" argument were
identified by the Court in Branzburg and have been relied on by other courts
to downplay the importance of the reporter's privilege. In Branzburg, Jus-
tice White explored the argument in detail:
We are admonished that refusal to provide a First Amendment reporter's
privilege will undermine the freedom of the press to collect and dissemi-
nate news. But this is not the lesson history teaches us. As noted previ-
ously, the common law recognized no such privilege, and the constitu-
tional argument was not even asserted until 1958. From the beginning of
our country the press has operated without constitutional protection for
141. Riley v. Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 1979) (internal citations omitted).
142. Reporters' Shield Legislation: Issues and Implications Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11 (2005) (statement of Norman Pearlstine, Editor in Chief, Time,
Inc.) [hereinafter Pearlstine Testimony].
143. Id.
144. Id. at 12.
145. Id. at 9.
146. Id. at 2-3.
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press informants, and the press has flourished. The existing constitu-
tional rules have not been a serious obstacle to either the development or
retention of confidential news sources by the press.
147
Justice White said that the chilling effect argument was further weak-
ened by the fact that the privilege advocated was qualified, not absolute.'
48
He stated the following:
Presumably, such a rule would reduce the instances in which reporters
could be required to appear, but predicting in advance when and in what
circumstances they could be compelled to do so would be difficult.... If
newsmen's confidential sources are as sensitive as they are claimed to
be, the prospect of being unmasked whenever a judge determines the
situation justifies it is hardly a satisfactory solution to the problem.
149
A similar conclusion was reached by a federal trial court in Rhode Island in
2003:
By definition, such a conditional privilege provides no guarantee of con-
fidentiality because it may be overridden when a court determines that it
is outweighed by the need for disclosure. If [the reporter] informed his
source of that fact, the source could not have had any justifiable expecta-
tion of anonymity. If [the reporter] failed to inform his source of that
fact, such failure cannot serve as a basis for refusing to furnish the re-
quested information.
150
This skepticism about whether the lack of a qualified privilege chills
reporting-as far as it goes-is probably well placed. This skepticism, how-
ever, ignores a source's ultimate and absolute protection: the willingness of
the reporter to go to jail in order to protect the reporter's promise of confi-
dentiality. Thus, what occurs in the newsroom is vital to understanding how
to protect the free flow of information.
2. Journalism Ethics and Confidential Sources
Whether to refuse a court order to name a confidential source or to pro-
tect other unpublished information is a question deeply and seriously con-
sidered by reporters, editors, and publishers. Some news gatherers, like re-
porter Judith Miller and book author Vanessa Leggett, are willing to spend
months in jail to protect their sources. Others, like Time's Matthew Cooper,
are fortunate enough to receive last-minute releases of confidentiality from
147. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 698-99 (1972).
148. Id. at 702.
149. Id.
150. In re Special Proceedings, 291 F. Supp. 2d 44, 55-56 (D.R.I. 2003).
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their sources. 15' And some, like Time itself, reluctantly decide to comply
with court orders when no other appeal or legal relief is available.' 52 While
these decisions presumably could be driven by fears of lawsuits by revealed
sources who had been promised confidentiality, they appear instead, in al-
most every case, to be based on journalism ethics.
As unsettled as the law is concerning the reporter's privilege, the state
of ethical standards in journalism might be even more confusing. Various
media companies and professional associations have their own ethical
guidelines, but no uniform industry standard is accepted or enforced outside
the company or association. Like reporters wondering about the applicabil-
ity of multiple states' shield laws, thoughtful sources surely must wonder
about the variety of ethical standards governing the reporters in whom they
confide.
How long, for example, will the reporter keep his or her notes? For that
matter, are the notes owned by the reporter or, as Time asserted with Coo-
per's notes, the company? Are e-mails between sources and reporters regu-
larly backed up and archived? Who inside or outside the company has ac-
cess to them? To whom within the company has the reporter been required
to provide the source's name? Are the recipients of that information bound
by the reporter's promise of confidentiality? Under what circumstances will
the reporter reveal the source's name? Are there circumstances in which the
promise of confidentiality might be dissolved entirely?
No consistent answers to these questions exist. Some reporters and
news companies have written policies regarding the destruction of notes and
e-mails; others do not. Some newspapers, like the San Jose Mercury News,
require reporters to provide their editors with the names, backgrounds, and
motives of all confidential sources.'53 Others, like the Los Angeles Times,
require an editor to pre-approve promises of confidentiality.5 4 In cases "of
exceptionally sensitive reporting, on crucial issues of law or national secu-
rity in which sources face dire consequences if exposed," The New York
Times allows the executive editor to approve a source's promise of "total
confidentiality," that is, confidentiality even from lower-ranking editors.
15
151. See Pearlstine Testimony, supra note 142, at 8.
152. See id.
153. San Jose Mercury News, available at http://www.mercurynews.com (last visited
Oct. 7, 2006) (follow "Ethics Policy" hyperlink).
154. American Society of Newspaper Editors, available at http://www.asne.org
/ideas/codes/losangelestimes.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2006) (follow "Archives" and "Codes
of Ethics" hyperlinks) [hereinafter ASNE].
155. The New York Times Co., Confidential News Sources, available at
http://www.nytco.com/company-properties-times-sources.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2006)
[hereinafter New York Times].
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Many media companies strive to clarify the relationship between re-
porter and source as much as possible. The New York Times, for example,
states that when confidentiality is granted, "it should be the subject of ener-
getic negotiation to arrive at phrasing that will tell the reader as much as
possible about the placement and motivation of the source."' 56 The ethics
policy of the Denver Post similarly provides that, "[i]n granting confidenti-
ality, the reporter must reach a clear understanding with the source, after
consultation with an editor, about how the information and attribution will
be presented in the story."' 5 7 The Post also seeks an understanding about
"what the source's reaction would be if a court orders the newspaper and/or
the reporter to divulge its source of information."'' 5 8 That reaction, the Post
says, "might determine whether certain sensitive information is pub-
lished."' 59 The Miami Herald, like many newspapers, believes "confidential-
ity is granted on behalf of the newspaper, not an individual" reporter. 60 If,
however, a source "knowingly gives false information for publication, the
commitment to confidentiality dissolves.''
3. Public Policy and Confidential Sources
One thing most "mainstream" media companies agree on is that prom-
ises of confidentiality should not be cavalierly made. 62 The clarity of their
statements to this effect and the availability of these statements to the public
appear designed to renew public confidence in reporting that utilizes confi-
dential sources and in the reliability of those sources. Renewing this confi-
dence is a necessary first step in building public and judicial support for a
reporter's privilege, whether that privilege be recognized in a federal or state
constitution, federal or state common law, or a shield statute.
The importance of this public support cannot be underestimated. De-
spite the challenges of and logical weaknesses within a qualified reporter's
156. Id. (emphasis omitted).
157. Denver Post, The Denver Post Ethics Policy, available at
http://www.denverpost.com/ethics (last visited Oct. 7, 2006) [hereinafter Denver Post].
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Miami Herald, Miami Herald Ethics Guidelines, available at http://www.miami.com
/mld/miamiherald/contact us/about/9057200.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2006) [hereinafter
Miami Herald].
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Miami Herald, supra note 160 (stating that anonymous sources should be
used only in "exceptional cases"); Denver Post, supra note 157 ("Anonymous sources are a
last resort."); ASNE, supra note 154 ("We stand against" practice of routinely granting ano-
nymity "and seek to minimize it."); New York Times, supra note 155 ("The use of unidenti-
fied sources is reserved for situations in which the newspaper could not otherwise print in-
formation it considers reliable and newsworthy.").
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privilege, a strong privilege is necessary to encourage the types of investiga-
tive reporting we need to effectively govern ourselves. Without a strong
privilege, the chilling effect of the most concern is not the one we hear the
most about-the reluctance of sources to speak to reporters-but rather the
reluctance of reporters to speak to sources. After all, the weaker and more
undependable the privilege becomes, the higher the risk that a promise of
confidentiality will place the journalist in a position in which the journalist
will have to choose between breaking a confidentiality pledge or going to
jail. The higher this risk becomes, the more reluctant reporters will be to
take it. And, the more hesitant reporters become about using confidential
sources, the more the free flow of information to the public will be re-
stricted.
V. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
The future of the reporter's privilege is difficult to predict. Most likely,
however, that future will not be shaped by broad legal pronouncements from
the United States Supreme Court or by national legislation, but rather by the
ability of reporters, editors, station managers, publishers, readers, viewers,
and their advocates to influence the ongoing public policy debate concern-
ing the desirability of the privilege. Given the subjectivity involved in ap-
plying even the strongest constitutional, common law, or statutory qualified
privilege, the public policy biases each judge brings to each subpoena ulti-
mately determine how freely information flows to the public. The surest and
best way to maximize this freedom is not to analyze and re-analyze
Branzburg and its progeny, but rather to persuade judges-and the public
they ultimately serve-that a strong reporter's privilege is necessary to pro-
tect a flow of information that is vital to an informed and meaningful de-
mocracy.
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